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12 Testing the market orientated
model of political parties in a
non-Western context
The case of Taiwan
Dafydd Fell and Isabelle Cheng
Multi-party politics are a relatively new phenomenon in Taiwan. Its first
democratic parliamentary and presidential elections were held as recently as 
1991 and 1996 respectively. Taiwan is the sole example of a Chinese multi-
party democracy and compared to other new democracies has relatively
institutionalized political parties. Moreover, since numerous restrictions on
campaigning practices were lifted, Taiwan’s parties have rapidly embraced many
of the marketing techniques associated with the American model of political
communication.
In this study we apply the Lees-Marshment model of market-oriented parties to
Taiwan, a country that is culturally and politically worlds apart from the model’s
British origin. We test whether in the first two decades of multi-party competition 
the leading parties have become increasingly market oriented. Or have the parties
remained either sales- or product-oriented? This puzzle is central to the political
science debate over whether parties are primarily motivated by policy, or the desire
to gain votes and government office. The second question examined is how can
we explain the degree that parties become market oriented? Lastly, we are
interested to see whether Lees-Marshment is correct in her assertion that the
market-oriented party should outperform rivals that adopt a sales- or product-
orientated approach. The analysis for this chapter was based on our observations
and content analysis of election advertising of eleven elections between 1992 and
2008. In addition, we conducted elite interviews in 2001, 2005 and 2008 and an
elite opinion survey in 2007.
The Taiwanese political market place
The party and electoral system
After almost four decades of authoritarian one party rule, Taiwan’s ruling party,
the Kuomintang (KMT) began a process of democratization in the late 1980s. The
first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed in 1986
and a year later, Martial Law finally was lifted.
Tables 12.1 and 12.2 show the pattern of continuity and change in the party
system since 1986. In the initial period, Taiwan had a one-party dominant system,
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in which the KMT won over three-quarters of seats. This dominance was
challenged in the 1990s by the DPP and a second significant opposition party, the
New Party (NP). The 2000 presidential election marked the end of KMT
dominance and the start of a competitive multi-party system, with the KMT and
DPP as the two large parties and the emergence of two new challenger parties, the
People First Party (PFP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). From 2000 to
2008 Taiwan had its first taste of divided government. For though the DPP won the
presidential elections of 2000 and 2004 and was the largest party in the 2001 and
2004 legislative elections, the KMT in conjunction with its ally the PFP held a
parliamentary majority. Following the KMT’s landslide victories in the 2008
elections, Taiwan appears to be returning to a two-party system, with the KMT
once again the most powerful force.
After the democratic opening Taiwan operated a mixed electoral system, with 
a multi-member district system in parliamentary contests and a single member
district first-past-the-post system for presidential and local executive elections.
Following recent constitutional reforms, Taiwan introduced a new electoral system
for the parliamentary elections in 2008. The new system is similar to that used in
Japan since 1996. Voters have two votes, one for a single member district
candidate and another for a proportional representation political party list.
As for voters, in contrast to the weakening of party ties in many mature
democracies, there was an increase in the level of Taiwanese voter party
identification during the 1990s. Since 1999 levels of party identification have
stabilized at approximately 60 per cent. The patterns of seat shares displayed in
Table 12.1 suggest a degree of voter volatility. However, party vote shares show
considerable stability over the last 16 years, with the two main parties tending to
gain around 80 per cent of the votes.
Table 12.1 Party seat shares in parliamentary elections in Taiwan, 1986–2008, %
1986 1989 1991 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008
KMT 80.8 71.3 78.2 59.6 51.8 54.7 30.2 35.1 71.7
DPP 16.7 20.8 20.3 31.1 32.9 31.1 38.7 39.6 24
NP 12.8 4.9 0.4 0.4 0
PFP 20.2 15.1 0.9
TSU 5.8 5.3 0
Table 12.2 Party vote shares in presidential elections in Taiwan, 1996–2008, %
1996 2000 2004 2008
KMT 54 23.1 49.9 58
DPP 21.1 39.3 50.1 42
NP 14.9 0.1
PFP 36.8
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Issue divisions
Like many other new democracies, the European left–right dimension is not the
central dividing spectrum for Taiwanese parties. Instead when Taiwanese analysts
talk of a left and right they mean a national identity spectrum in which the far left
emphasizes Taiwanese identity and calls for declaration of independence from
China, while the far right emphasizes Chinese nationalist symbols and argues for
unification with China. The KMT has tended to be located on the centre right and
the DPP on the left of this spectrum. In addition to identity, the parties have also
competed on policy differences related to democratic reforms, social welfare,
political corruption, and economic policy. Survey data suggest that parties would
be best advised to take a moderate stance on national identity, and rather than
focusing exclusively on identity matters, they should also address other salient
issues. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s leading parties have a core of supporters, activists
and politicians that are more ideologically focused on identity and hold more
extreme positions on identity than the average voter. Therefore parties need to find
a balance between satisfying the electoral market and maintaining internal
cohesion.
Political communication and advertising
Simultaneous with democratization came media liberalization. In the late 1980s
restrictions on new newspapers were lifted and in the 1990s there was a huge
expansion in the number of cable television channels. By the late 1990s the island
had a highly liberalized media market, rated by Freedom House (n. d.) as the freest
press in Asia. A result of the explosion in cable news channels was the advent of
politics discussion shows similar to the UK’s weekly BBC show Question Time.
The difference is that in Taiwan these shows are aired every night on up to ten
different channels.
Taiwanese political analysts distinguish between the open public face of
campaigning, known as the “propaganda battle” and the “private face of the
campaign” or “the organizational battle” (Fell, 2007). The latter terms refer to
clientelistic practices in which the KMT factions mobilize their clients to vote
KMT in return for economic benefits, and factional vote brokers employ emotional
and material persuasion to convince voters to support a party candidate. In
exchange for political support candidates are expected to offer voters “service,”
incorporating diverse areas such as attending weddings or funerals, and even
resolving disputes with the police. The liberalization of campaigning restrictions
meant that the “propaganda battle” became increasingly influential in determining
electoral outcomes. In the late 1980s, it was finally possible to hold election rallies
and political demonstrations, and newspaper election advertisements were
permitted for the first time. From the mid-1990s, Taiwan adopted a US-style free
market in paid television campaign advertising. TV ads soon became the largest
item of campaign expenditure. The deregulation benefited the KMT, as its superior
financial resources enabled it to massively outspend its rivals. Increasingly large-
scale televised election rallies that mixed entertainment and political speeches
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replaced the small-scale local political rallies. The most recent development in
political communication has been the use of the Internet, as the main parties have
invested heavily in sophisticated websites. There is no doubt that the importance
of the modern methods associated with the “propaganda battle” has risen
significantly compared to the organizational battle. Nevertheless in many
constituencies, parties still need to find a balance between traditional and modern
campaigning.
Political marketing techniques in Taiwan
Over a short time period the resource-rich main parties have professionalized their
approach to political marketing. According to advertising expert Hong Ya-hui, “In
ten short years, the quality of Taiwan’s election ads has overtaken the United
States” (interviewed by Fell, 2001). Moreover, while initially the parties’
campaigns were designed by party leaders, increasingly they have made use of
political consultants, particularly from the commercial advertising industry. As
the KMT’s Mu Min-chu explained, “It’s harder to do propaganda these days, so
you have to learn from the advertising companies, to make the ads like Elizabeth
Arden” (interviewed by Fell, 2001). The parties have also invested heavily in
survey technology since the early 1990s in order to improve their understanding of
the product preferences of voters. The results of these polls have been used for the
increasingly targeted communication messages adopted by the leading parties.
Political marketing strategy in Taiwan
We now return to the questions set out at the outset, namely, the degree to which
parties have become market orientated, how we best account for their market
orientation and whether the market-oriented party has a clear electoral advantage.
Table 12.3 summarizes the pattern of party market orientation in the 1990s and
post-2000 periods.
The KMT in the 1990s
At the outset of multi-party politics, the KMT was still a product-oriented party
that was only beginning to learn a more sales-oriented approach. The lack of an
opposition party and direct national level elections meant that the ruling KMT was
insulated from societal pressures under Martial Law. KMT slogans about “retaking
Table 12.3 Summary of direction of party change in Taiwan on the MOP spectrum,
1991–2008
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
1991–1996 1996–2000 2000–2004 2004–2008
KMT SOP MOP MOP SOP SOP MOP MOP SOP MOP
DPP POP SOP POP POP SOP MOP MOP SOP MOP MOP SOP
POP = Product-Oriented Party; SOP = Sales-Oriented Party; MOP = Market-Oriented Party
←←←←←←←
←←←←←
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the mainland (China)” revealed how out of step with public opinion the KMT had
become. It was only after the introduction of democratic competition and the
growing strength of President Lee Teng-hui’s Mainstream faction in the KMT that
the party became more responsive to the political market.
The first full democratic election in 1991 revealed how far the KMT had traveled
from its earlier product-oriented party position. Regarding policy, the KMT was
closer to the median voter than its challengers. Rather than stressing its pro-
unification position, it warned voters of the dangers of Taiwanese independence.
This was combined with messages about the KMT’s economic achievements and
its record of gradual political reforms. The KMT’s political communication was also
superior to its rivals. For instance, its newspaper ads tended to use simple but
effective slogans that played on voters’ fears of a Chinese invasion. Nevertheless, the
KMT’s transition to a sales-oriented party should not be exaggerated. Even after
the legalization of political advertising, the KMT did not initially invest heavily in
these areas. Instead it remained reliant on more traditional campaigning methods
known as the “organizational battle.” Moreover, the continued strength of the
ideologically more conservative Non-Mainstream faction meant that the KMT still
needed to give at least lip service to unpopular calls for unification with China.
1993 was a turning point in the transformation of the KMT. That year Lee’s last
major rival was removed from government office, leaving his Mainstream faction
dominant. He not only tried to drag his party closer to public opinion on the
identity spectrum but also continued to try to steal popular opposition policies.
There was a significant shift in the KMT’s communication style, with increasing
expenditure on political advertising and conducting surveys rather than the
previous over-reliance on the “organizational battle.” These measures enabled the
KMT to do what most formerly authoritarian parties fail to do, to keep winning
elections after the transition.
The KMT was the first party to understand the power of TV ads once the cable
TV market was fully liberalized. Being the richest party in the world, the KMT
was able to vastly outspend its rivals on TV ads. The party’s communication made
great use of its number one asset, Lee Teng-hui, who was actually far more popular
than the party itself. Also the KMT was becoming increasingly sophisticated in
targeting key social groups that it needed to win over. For instance, in the face of
stiff competition from the NP for the support of mainlanders in the 1995 legislative
elections, the KMT produced a series of TV and newspaper ads designed to
convince that ethnic group that it was the best defender of their interests.
On the policy front, as Lee’s Mainstream faction came to the fore in the party,
they had the flexibility to take an increasingly market-orientated approach that was
quite distinct from that when policy was dominated by the out of touch elite of the
Martial Law era. The KMT tactics showed its awareness of how public opinion
was shifting from the center-right to the center-left on the identity spectrum.
Although the KMT’s adjustment often infuriated party loyalists, it enabled the
KMT to continue to win elections. A number of policy shifts reveal the KMT’s
new approach towards popular opposition policies. After condemning the DPP
call for attempting to reenter the United Nations in the early 1990s, the KMT did
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a policy flip-flop in 1993 by making this official government policy. By taking a
strong line against Chinese military threats, the KMT also won credit from the
Taiwanese nationalists, particularly in the 1996 presidential election. The KMT
was effective in winning support by taking popular social welfare demands from
the DPP, particularly the Universal National Health Insurance program, which
featured in KMT ads throughout the 1990s. Therefore by the time of the 1996
presidential election the KMT had reached its most market-oriented point to date.
Despite its electoral success up to 1998, a number of weaknesses in the KMT’s
product contributed to its eventual loss of power. Although Lee’s alliance with
local factions enabled him to win the inner party power struggle, it also had serious
costs. The local factions were widely associated with political corruption and
organized crime. Thus, a number of related scandals involving KMT politicians
led to swathes of voters defecting to the DPP or NP. This was ultimately critical in
the KMT’s loss of power in 2000. As one veteran KMT politician reflected,
I believe that the main reason that Taiwan’s people threw away the KMT at
the last election (2000) was not that we had failed with public policies,
popularizing education, health insurance, development of high-tech industry,
in all these areas we were very successful . . . they wanted change as the KMT
had done badly on political corruption. (Ting Shou-chung, interviewed by
Fell, 2001)
Despite its superior financial resources there were also weaknesses in its
organization and communication. The KMT had the greatest access to market
polling of any party, with its own polling centre and the resources to commission
private polls. However, the hierarchical structure of the party organization meant
that such data often failed to permeate the highest levels of the party and thus had
little impact on its issue emphasis. There were occasions where the KMT tried to
commission surveys that would produce the “desired” results and even refused to
accept polls with unfavourable findings (Hsia, 2000). Similarly, though the KMT
was able to outspend its rivals in advertising the results were often poor due to the
KMT’s hierarchal structure. For instance, Hong commented on the KMT’s 2000
campaign,
Lien (KMT’s candidate) used a number of advertising agencies and there were
so many high level figures to please. When the agency was happy with
something, big shots insisted on several revisions. When the KMT was
satisfied, the advertising companies were not. (interviewed by Fell, 2001)
Similarly, well resourced campaigns produced confused election messages due to
poor coordination of multiple campaign headquarters. A former KMT propaganda
chief described the party’s failed 1998 campaign for Kaohsiung mayor, “It was a
five-headed cart. The official residence faction, the wife’s faction, city government
faction, the PR company faction and the party branch faction. That’s why the
campaign was such a mess” (interviewed by Fell, 2001).
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The DPP in the 1990s
In contrast to the sales-oriented KMT of 1991, the DPP adopted a product-
orientation approach. This was the result of an internal shift in the power structure
towards the more radical factions. The party focused on radical independence,
calling for the declaration of a Republic of Taiwan. While the emphasis on inde-
pendence and violent actions such as street demonstrations and fights in parliament
helped solidify core DPP support, they also scared off middle class or floating
voters, limiting the party’s scope for expansion. At this point the DPP still lagged
behind the KMT in survey technology and seriously misread the mood of popular
opinion.
The DPP’s 1991 advertising campaign also revealed its product-oriented
approach. For instance, unlike the KMT’s short but terrifying slogan ads, many
DPP newspaper ads were lengthy full-page essays on why a Republic of Taiwan
was right for the island. Few voters would have the patience to get through such
academic-style arguments. Unsurprisingly, the DPP’s marketing failures of 1991
contributed to a humiliating election defeat to the sales-oriented KMT.
Following the DPP’s disastrous 1991 election, the party began a long journey
from a product-oriented party to first a sales-oriented party and by the 2000
presidential contest, the closest the party has been to a market-oriented party.
Throughout this period the party showed itself to be increasingly able to react to
market pressures coming from opinion polls and election results to redesign its
product. This was not an easy transition, in fact the title of a book by a DPP insider,
DPP: The Pain of Transition, paints a picture of how hard change was for the party
(Kuo, 1998).
It was to be a shift in the internal party balance of power that enabled the party
to make such a painful transition from a radical protest movement to a real
candidate for central government. The rise of more moderate party leaders such
as Hsu Hsin-liang and Chen Shui-bian contributed to shifting the party in a
radically different direction in its issue emphasis, policy positions, party image
and political communication.
Under Hsu, Chen Fang-ming was the first propaganda chief to revamp the party’s
advertising. Thus in 1992 the DPP’s TV slots looked highly professional for the
first time. This trend was continued under the next and first female propaganda chief
of any Taiwanese party, Chen Wen-chien. Her campaign was particularly
outstanding in 1997, with systematic TV ads and well designed election rallies led
by the famous Spice Girls campaigning troupe that combined entertainment and
shorter political speeches. In response to the rise of cable news channels, Chen
Wen-chien successfully designed campaign rallies that would be effective for both
a TV and rally audience.
There was also a revolution in the issue emphasis that brought the party closer
to public opinion. The DPP formed its survey research department in the early
1990s and during the decade increasingly used surveys to design its campaigns.
The party began to conduct regular polls on its party image. These surveys were
designed to examine the party’s issue and image strengths. These surveys found
the party had serious weaknesses among middle class, younger, female, and older
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voters. In policy and party image the surveys showed voters were uncomfortable
with its radical Taiwanese independence position, and its reputation for using
violence. These were all areas where the DPP made significant efforts to improve
its party image to expand its vote share.
Firstly, the DPP’s Taiwanese independence position was moderated and 
de-emphasized. This involved dropping references to a Republic of Taiwan and
instead stressing more electorally popular components of Taiwan independence,
such as the United Nations reentry appeal and attacking unification. But equally
important was the shift into a broader issue emphasis on policy areas that were to
be critical in its expansion into the middle class and other social groups where the
party was weak. The issue areas were political corruption, social welfare, and
gender issues. Surveys showed that these were all areas where the DPP had an
advantage over the KMT. Also the DPP was to be increasingly effective at setting
the electoral agenda on what surveys told it to be its more favorable election issues.
The DPP’s social welfare appeal was begun in the early 1990s and was used
consistently throughout the decade. It was effective as almost 60 percent of the
population were excluded from the old welfare system. Moreover, even after
universal health insurance came into effect, the vast majority of elderly were
without pensions and this was to be consistently stressed by the DPP. Once the DPP
had a new female propaganda chief, it was able to address its low female support,
with heavy emphasis on appeals for child care, child allowances and stress on
female victims of crime. Nevertheless, the issue the DPP campaigned most heavily
on in the 1990s was political corruption. This appeal was especially effective with
urban middle class voters disillusioned with KMT corruption. In repeated
campaigns the DPP was able to discredit the KMT, with accusations of vote buying,
contract corruption, and embezzlement by high-level KMT politicians.
In order to improve the party image among younger voters, the leadership
attempted to change the tone of the election campaigns. In particular, the party
discouraged the use of violent antics that had often been used in the late Martial
Law era and also reduced the emphasis on what was known as the “Tragic
Taiwanese Appeal.” This refers to appeals focusing on the suffering of Taiwanese
under Martial Law. By the early 1990s, such appeals were less effective especially
among the younger generation of voters that had not experienced the height of
“White Terror.” Analysts regard the DPP’s 1994 Taipei “Hope, Happiness, Chen
Shui-bian” campaign as the first to make the break from the “tragic” appeals.1
The party also looked different in terms of its leadership and candidates, as all
improved their media image radically. In election debates and on the politics 
talk shows, DPP politicians tended to be far more articulate than their KMT rivals.
For instance, in the first televised debate in the Taipei mayoral election in 1994, 
the KMT candidate was completely upstaged by his DPP opponent. It became
common for KMT candidates to refuse to participate in such activities for fear of
losing face.
There were of course campaigns when the DPP product failed, as it shifted back
to a more sales- or product-oriented approach. The strength of more ideologically
oriented factions meant that there were limitations to how far the party could move
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towards the centre. In 1996 the DPP nominated a radical Taiwan independence
leader as its presidential candidate. He ran a single-issue campaign that contrasted
sharply with the moderate image that the party headquarters had been trying to
mold since 1992. As we can see from Tables 12.1 and 12.2, this produced the
DPP’s worst election result since 1991. Similarly, the DPP was slower than the
KMT to grasp the significance of the new liberalized TV ad market. As a campaign
manager commented on the DPP’s defeat in Taipei in 1998, “We didn’t adjust to
media developments. We spent too much money on newspaper ads, but ignored
two new trends, the TV ads and the 24 Hour news channels” (ChangYi-shan,
interviewed by Fell, 2001).
Following the DPP’s poor electoral performance in 1996 and 1998, it made a
number of significant efforts to learn from defeat. Firstly, it improved its TV
advertising in the 2000 presidential campaign. The propaganda campaign was
highly centralized under one of Chen Shui-bian’s youthful advisors Luo Wen-chia,
in conjuction with one of the top advertising experts Fan Ke-ching. They created
what advertising specialists still regard as the most effective propaganda campaign
in Taiwan’s electoral history. Secondly, the party tried to change the content and
tone of Chen’s speeches in response to the new media environment, creating a
special speech writing team. Thirdly, the party needed to adjust its policies to give
it a more moderate image. On the critical national identity spectrum it passed the
Resolution on Taiwan’s Future, which for the first time accepted the Republic of
China as the national title and the position that there is no need to declare
Taiwanese independence as Taiwan is already independent. This was a significant
moderation for the DPP and brought it closer to the median voter. These reforms
along with an emphasis on welfare and anti-corruption meant that the DPP reached
its most market-oriented position in its successful 2000 presidential campaign.
The KMT in the post-2000 era
The KMT’s defeat in the 2000 presidential election had a devastating impact on the
party and led to its most serious internal soulsearching since it lost the Chinese
Civil War in 1949. Being freed from the concerns of being the ruling party gave
the KMT greater flexibility to adjust its product. The party embarked on a series of
radical reforms to its leadership, campaign style and policy positions. These
changes have contributed to the party’s gradual recovery and eventual return to
ruling party status in 2008. A critical factor in this post-defeat transformation was
the changing balance of power away from Lee’s Mainstream faction towards
politicians associated with the Non-Mainstream faction, such as Ma Ying-jeou.
In terms of party leadership, the KMT’s initial post-2000 picture was not
encouraging as no one challenged the uncharismatic Lien in the first chairman
primary in 2001, which almost guaranteed he would be the party’s candidate in
2004’s presidential election. Although he joined with his former rival James Soong
in a joint presidential team and had a huge opinion poll lead six months before the
election, they finally lost narrowly. The hierarchal nature of the KMT meant that
party ranking rather market appeal determined its presidential team in 2004.
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The leadership has been more market-oriented since the KMT’s first competitive
party chairman primary in 2005, won by Ma. Under Ma, the KMT reached its most
united and popular state since the late 1990s. A key factor in this recovery has been
Ma’s willingness to take advice from political consultants and polling experts from
outside the KMT. As a result, Ma’s presidential campaign was targeted on areas
where the KMT had performed poorly since the mid-1990s, particularly the south
of the island and rural regions. This targeted approach was visible in two of Ma’s
key campaign projects. The first was known as the “Long Stay,” in which Ma would
live in rural people’s homes and work in the fields with farmers for several days.
Secondly, Ma led his campaign team on a 675 kilometer cycle tour from the far
south to the far north of Taiwan. Once again, polling data was used to target regions
where KMT support level was lower in selecting locations for rest stops.
In terms of policy, the KMT tried to learn from the 2000 defeat in adjusting
policy positions of the 1990s, though in some cases this made it actually less
market-oriented. One positive move was its attempt to change its damaging
reputation for political corruption. The KMT passed regulations designed to avoid
nominating candidates linked to corruption. Moreover, as the party had lost both
central and most local offices by 2000, it was less vulnerable to accusations of
corruption. By 2005 it was apparent that the KMT’s efforts had paid off, as DPP
government scandals ensured the corruption issue was beneficial to the KMT for
the first time, contributing significantly to the party’s sweeping local election
victory that year.
The party has also taken a popular line in attacking the DPP for its poor
economic record and reminding voters of the fine economic times under KMT
management.
On the crucial national identity issue, the KMT initially moved away from the
market, reverting to more orthodox Chinese nationalist symbols and calling for
unification. This was closely related to the strong level of competition coming
from the PFP and NP to the right from 2000 to 2002. In the run up to the 2004
presidential election the party again seemed to be moving back to the center,
stressing its love for Taiwan, and, though referendums are associated in Taiwan
with independence, the KMT allowed a referendum bill to be passed in parliament.
Under Ma it is not clear exactly what the party position on identity is, with
mixed messages coming out of the party headquarters. For instance, in 2006 it
reiterated that the party’s ultimate aim is unification with China. Also it has once
again placed heavy emphasis on Chinese nationalist symbols such as Chiang 
Kai-shek, despite their low popularity. Nevertheless, after Ma had received KMT
nomination he made efforts to shift the party back towards the center again. In
2007 Ma began to contest the DPP’s ownership of the Taiwan identity appeal. For
instance, he published a book titled The Native Spirit: Taiwan’s Exemplary Stories
and has endorsed the KMT referendum proposal to apply for United Nations
membership.
While Lee’s KMT took a mixed approach between the organizational and
propaganda battle, Ma is trying to focus on the latter to make the party electable
again. The quality of the KMT’s party propaganda has improved considerably
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since 2000. It has been more willing to allow advertising companies to have a free
hand in designing products. For instance, in 2001 Fan Ke-ching (who had designed
the DPP’s advertising in 2000) designed the KMT’s election advertisements. The
KMT has also attempted to learn from the marketing successes of the DPP. It has
invited DPP defectors to advise in KMT election campaigns. For instance, the
central advisor to Lien’s 2004 presidential campaign was former DPP party
propaganda chief Chen Wen-chien. Similarly, like the DPP in the 1990s, the KMT
has become increasingly ready to give articulate younger politicians influential
campaign positions.
In short, it was the reaction to a disastrous presidential defeat and a shift in the
inner party balance of power towards Ma’s faction that pushed the KMT towards
the more market-oriented approach that contributed to the party’s return to power
in 2008.
The DPP in the post-2000 era
Like many parties worldwide the DPP struggled to remain a market-oriented party
after making the transition from opposition to ruling party. During its 2000 election
campaign, it raised unrealistic expectations that it was unable to deliver. Under
the DPP, Taiwan suffered its worst economic recession and highest unemployment
since the 1940s. It had considerable achievements in improving the social wel-
fare system, particularly in the area of pensions. Nevertheless, the realities of
government office made it far less enthusiastic on new welfare pledges than when
in opposition.
The DPP also lost ownership of the anti-corruption issue that had been so
effective in its rise to power. Particularly after 2004 the DPP was dogged by
numerous alleged corruption scandals, some involving the president and his
family. Instead the party had often been forced back to rely on the identity issue,
despite the fact that opinion polls show voters do not see this as the number one
priority. During the DPP’s first presidential term (2000–2004) it did attempt to
take the center ground on the identity issue, promising not to declare independence
and taking a conciliatory line in relations with China. However, in the second term
the party returned to radical positions similar to those it had taken in 1991 and
1996, its two most disastrous product-oriented campaigns. For instance, in 2004’s
parliamentary elections it began calling for “name rectification,” a term that can
incorporate changing the national title, the names of state-owned enterprises and
overseas government offices to Taiwan. Then in 2006 Chen broke one of his
inaugural pledges by scrapping the National Unification Guidelines and a year
later the party chairman Yu Hsi-kun called for the adoption of a new constitution
to redefine Taiwan’s official title and territory.
How can we explain the DPP’s apparent shift away from the market after 2004?
Although the party’s access to opinion polls is greater than ever, it would appear
that the message was struggling to seep through to those designing party policy.
Apart from complexities of being the government party, there were also significant
changes in the inner party power structure that contributed to this shift away from
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a market-oriented party. Firstly, Chen’s position as president (and party chairman
between July 2002 and December 2004) made him the most powerful DPP leader
to date. He has been less accessible to those younger advisors that guided him 
in the 1990s, such as Luo Wen-chia. In fact there were rumblings about his
overemphasis on identity to the detriment of social issues in the aftermath of the
2004 parliamentary election setback.
The factional balance of power was also highly influential on the party’s post-
2000 fluctuations between more market- and sales-oriented marketing on identity.
The two most influential positions were the premier and party chairman. When
moderates held these posts the party took more market-oriented positions. For
instance, while Hsieh Chang-ting was party chairman in 2000–2002 there was a
more conciliatory policy towards China. In contrast, more confrontational tactics
such as the anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign of 2006–2007 coincided with the
chairmanship of Yu Hsi-kun. Yu’s sales-oriented tactics caused criticism within
the party, as they further alienated middle-ground voters in the run up to the
presidential election in 2008.
Despite these moves away from the market-oriented party model in issue
emphasis, the DPP continued to perform well in its political communication. The
DPP showed remarkable skill in controlling the issue agenda in the run-up to
elections. For instance, a year before the 2004 presidential election the KMT had
a huge opinion poll lead, but the DPP was able to maintain the media’s agenda on
its more favorable issues for almost the whole campaign and thus narrow the
KMT’s lead and eventually win the election. However, during the second DPP
term, though the party still dominated the issue agenda and produced quality
advertising, this was unable to compensate for the weaknesses in its political
product that ultimately led to the series of electoral defeats to the increasingly
market-oriented KMT.
Political marketing trends and conclusion
We have examined the market orientation of Taiwanese parties during the first two
decades of multi-party competition. Taiwanese parties have been highly adaptable
in designing their marketing strategies in these campaigns. They have reacted to
messages from election results and surveys to create a unique hybrid style of
political communication that incorporates imported techniques but also local issues
and campaign practices.
We have shown that there has not been a linear movement towards the market-
oriented party model. Instead, the KMT and DPP have fluctuated between more
sales- and market-oriented approaches. We found support for Lees-Marshment’s
assumption that market-orientation will have significant implications for election
results. In other words, a sales-oriented party will generally beat a product-oriented
party, and a market-oriented party will generally beat a sales-oriented party.
The most consistently useful variable for explaining parties’ market-orientation
has been inner-party balance of power. When the party is dominated by more
election-oriented leaders or factions, parties have tended to take a more moderate
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and market-oriented approach. In contrast, with more ideologically oriented
factions holding the upper hand, priority has been given to ideological orthodoxy,
even where this is electoral poison. Another key factor in the degree of market
orientation has been the electoral system. Thus for instance, the need to appeal to
the majority of centrist voters in single member district presidential elections has
prompted leading parties to take more market-oriented approaches, while they
have often reverted to core appeals under the multi-member district parliamentary
elections. However, the move to a single member district system for parliamentary
elections after 2008 may prove a further incentive for market-oriented party
practices.
The overall trend towards more market orientation for the leading parties has
significant implications for the quality of Taiwan’s democracy. The market-
oriented approach does not necessarily result in identical catch-all parties. It is 
our contention that in the case of Taiwan, the shift towards market orientation 
of parties has positive implications. At the outset of multi-party politics, Taiwan’s
parties were out of line with the electorate in both their most stressed issues 
and positions on the central issue dimensions. Election results and public 
opinion trends have forced the parties to radically adapt their political product 
to suit the electoral market by moderating their positions and adjusting their issue
emphasis.
Note
1 Point made by numerous DPP campaign managers in interviews with Fell in 2000 
and 2001.
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Interviews by Dafydd Fell
Chang Yi-shan (2001) DPP campaign manager in the 1990s, interviewed October.
Hong Ya-hui (2001) Advertising specialist, interviewed 14 May.
KMT Propaganda Chief (2001) Interviewed October.
Mu Min-chu (2001) Deputy Director of KMT propaganda department, interviewed October.
Ting Shou-chung (2001) Senior KMT legislator, interviewed September.
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